The impact of population aging on the steady state solution to a Ordover and Phelps (1979) overlapping generations optimal nonlinear income tax problem with two types of workers and quasilinear-in-leisure preferences is investigated. A decrease in the rate of population growth, which leads to an aging population, increases the relative price of consumption per person in retirement, which tends to decrease optimal consumption for retirees of both skill types. It is also shown that the optimal steady state rate of interest equals the rate of population growth. As a result, the steady state interest rate unambiguously declines when the rate of population growth declines. The resulting adjustments in production plans has an ambiguous effect on the aggregate wage rate. This article identifies factors contributing to an increase in the aggregate wage when the population ages, namely normality of consumption in retirement, complementarity between capital and labor in production, and a large capital deepening effect relative to the increase in dependency owing to demographic change. Depending on the sign of this wage effect, ambiguities may arise in the direction of change in the optimal steady state consumption and production plans. It is also shown that the optimal marginal income tax rates are independent of the rate of population growth. JEL classification: D82, H21
Introduction
The effects of population aging on public finances are potentially profound. As Visco (2001) argues, population aging is expected to exert upward pressure on government expenditure. These pressures on expenditure may be cause for policy concern in that they call for redistribution of resources among generations. 1 Moreover, governments must call upon distortionary taxation to fund expenditures. Thus, it is also important to understand how population aging affects the revenue side of the public budget.
This article addresses the effects of population aging on optimal distortionary income taxes using a model that embeds the Mirrlees (1971) personal income tax framework into an overlapping generations model. The distortionary effects of personal income taxation are modeled as arising out of information asymmetry between the taxation authority and individuals. The population of workers is divided into two classes, differing in exogenous labor productivity. The two types of workers are assumed to be perfect substitutes in production. Following the standard set of assumptions, the taxation authority is assumed to observe only market earnings, which are a mixture of innate ability and hours of work.
Because the goal of this paper is to examine the effects of parameter changes on the optimal tax schedule, and not to elaborate on further properties of the tax schedule itself, the government is assumed to use only the nonlinear income tax to further its redistributive goals.
The dynamic structure is equally simple, deriving in a straightforward way from a commonly used deterministic overlapping generations model. Population aging is modeled by allowing the number of workers in each generation to grow at a constant rate per generation, and allowing the rate of growth of new workers to decline. The model is very similar to the one used by Ordover and Phelps (1979) to describe optimal income taxes with a continuum of workers. 2 A two-class version of the Ordover-Phelps model, 1 See, however, McDaniel (2003) for a critical assessment of "apocalyptic demography" in the Canadian context.
2 See Myles (1995, pp. 509-514) for a textbook treatment of this analysis.
allowing for the possibility of endogenous relative wages, was introduced by Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001) in order to analyze capital taxation and public good provision.
The effects of population aging are demonstrated by deriving how the steady state optimal income tax changes in response to a change in the rate of population growth.
The steady state envisioned is one in which the capital per worker of each type is constant over time. Given the assumptions on technology, capital per unit of labor in efficiency units is constant at a steady state. Confining attention to changes in steady states renders the analysis similar in form and in spirit to the literature on the comparative statics of nonlinear taxation, pioneered by Weymark (1987) and recently extended by Hamilton and Pestieau (2005) , Boadway and Pestieau (2007) , Simula (2007) , Brett and Weymark (2008a) , and Brett and Weymark (2008c) . The overlapping generations framework endogenizes many of the variables that are assumed to be exogenous in a static nonlinear income tax framework, such as the amount of labor in efficiency units required to produce one unit of the consumption good. However, the relative wage rates and the rate of population growth are exogenous. Thus, it is reasonable to carry out comparative steady state analysis with respect to these variables. I choose not to consider the effects of changes in the relative wage rate, because the model is similar enough to that of Weymark (1987) and Brett and Weymark (2008a) The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the model, paying careful attention to the information assumptions contained therein.
Section 3 derives some qualitative features of optimal taxation in this environment. Section 4 provides a mathematical formulation of the comparison among steady states and offers verbal statements of the effects of population aging on the optimal tax schedule.
There are two types of workers born each period. During the first period of their lives, they supply labor elastically and they consume. In the second period of life, each individual retires. Within a generation, individuals differ in productivity. Denote the productivity of a person of type i by a i , i = 1, 2, a 1 < a 2 . 3 Thus, if a person supplies l i units of labor, her effective labor is y i := a i l i . At any date (apart from the startup period), t, the following types of individuals are alive: young individuals, some of type a 1 ,the others with productivity a 2 ; retired individuals, born at time t − 1, living off the proceeds of their savings. I assume that the number of workers varies from periodto-period, but that the within-period composition of workers is fixed. For simplicity, I assume that exactly half the workers in each time period are of type 1, and denote the number of such workers by N t . The number of workers of each type evolves according to the equation
which states that the population grows at a constant rate n. The focus of this paper is to investigate how changes in n affect the optimal tax system in the steady state.
Total output at any date t is a function of the capital stock, K t , and total effective labor,
Let F (K t , Y t ) be the production function, assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale and to be strictly concave, with isoquants that do not intersect the coordinated axes, for all positive levels of output. The prices of inputs are determined by the profit- maximization conditions
where w t is the price of effective labor and r t is the rental price of capital. The before-tax income of an individual is given by
Total consumption at time t is made up of consumption by the young born at that date, denoted by the symbol c, and the spending in retirement of those born at date t−1, denoted by x. Depreciation is assumed away, so that the capital stock evolves according to the equation
That is, capital next period equals current output plus current capital less total consumption of those currently alive. Because production exhibits constant returns to scale, the evolution of the capital stock per young worker of each type can be tracked with the equation
where lowercase quantities are their respective uppercase analogs divided by N t and
The government can observe both z and w, but cannot observe l or a. This accords with the standard assumptions of nonlinear tax theory. It is equivalent to say that the planner can observe y. Implicitly, then, the planner can also observe k. Because l is unobserved, the planner must resort to distortionary taxation. Exactly which tax instruments are available to the planner depend on the further assumptions one makes about the use of non-income information. It is assumed that the planner knows the age of each individual, so that the young cannot pretend to be old, nor can the old pretend to be young. The old do not work, so there is no direct interaction between them and the income tax schedule. Thus, the only concern is that the young may have incentive to misrepresent their ability. Given that information about type is revealed when young, the planner can distinguish between retirees of the same generation. Thus, without loss of generality, it is assumed that the tax on consumption of the old is pre-paid at the end of the first period of life. Because retirees simply consume their after-tax savings, one need not worry about the potential ratchet effect arising from disclosure of information in the first period. 4
Individuals derive utility from consumption when young and consumption during retirement. Moreover, they are assumed to have a disutility of labor. All individuals have a common utility function, assumed to be quasi-linear in labor supply, so that preferences are represented by
The function v is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable at all (c, x) = (0, 0), continuous and nondecreasing on R 2 + , strictly increasing on R 2 ++ , and strictly concave on
The limiting assumptions
on v ensure that the optimal tax problem has a solution and that individuals of both types have positive consumption of both goods at this solution.
Differences in ability generate differences in preferences over consumption and effective labor, which, following Weymark (1987) are conveniently represented by the type-specific monotonic transformation of (8)
representation is linear in both y and in the unobserved characteristic a. This linearity is heavily exploited in the analysis of Section 3.
The taxation authority is assumed to select a tax system that specifies an amount of tax to be paid on labor income, along with a levy on the amount of savings. Equivalently, it can be modeled as choosing the consumption levels and effective labor time for each type of worker at each date in time, subject to incentive compatibility constraints. I analyze only the case in which a person of high ability may wish to misrepresent its type.
That is, at each date, only one form of self-selection constraints is considered, namely 
where variables without time superscripts denote steady state values.
The government is assumed to maximize a weighted sum of steady-state utilities 5
The welfare function (12) is equivalent to the weighted average utilitarian criterion, where the weights are over the two types. In order for the sum in (12) to be meaningful, the utility function v must have cardinal significance. Welfare can be re-expressed in terms of observable variables as
where λ i = α i /a i is the skill-normalized welfare weight assigned to individuals of type i.
I assume that λ 1 > λ 2 , which implies that a redistribution of before-tax income (labor supply) from individuals of type 1 to individuals of type 2 is always welfare improving.
Thus, the self-selection constraint (10) must bind at a solution to the planner's problem.
In the steady state, this binding constraint is given by the equation
Following Weymark (1986) , I also assume that the skill-normalized welfare weights sum to the number of types of individuals in the economy; that is,
The Steady State Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Problem. The government chooses an allocation (c 1 , c 2 , x 1 , x 2 , k, y 1 , y 2 ) ∈ R 7 + to maximize the social welfare function (13) subject to the resource constraint (11) and the binding self-selection constraint (14).
In order to carry out any comparative static exercise, it is first necessary to show that the problem at hand has a unique solution. Lemma 1 establishes that this is so for the Steady State Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Problem. Lemma 2. Let (c 1 ,c 2 ,x 1 ,x 2 ,k,ỹ 1 ,ỹ 2 ) solve the Steady State Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Problem. Then (c 1 ,c 2 ,x 1 ,x 2 ,k,ỹ) solves:
where
and
Brett and Weymark (2008c) call β 1 and β 2 the reduced form welfare weights. These weights measure the marginal social value of an increase in the utility from consumption (in either or both periods) of the individuals of the two types. The normalization λ 1 +λ 2 = 2 and the assumptions that λ 1 > λ 2 and a 2 > a 1 imply that β 2 > a 1 > β 1 . The social value of the utility of individuals of type 1 is less than the raw welfare weight a 1 because this utility brings with it added temptation for persons of type 2 to mimic those of type 
6 Weymark (1987 Weymark ( , p. 1171 ) provides a detailed discussion justifying the exact form of the reduced form welfare weight. 7 One technical complication remains. There is no guarantee that the solution procedure outlined here guarantees thatỹ 1 > 0. I assume this to be the case throughout the remainder of the analysis.
With this assumption, all elements of the optimal program can be shown to be positive.
After introducing the variable µ to describe the shadow value of the constraint (11), the solution to (16) can be easily described in terms of the following first-order conditions.
− 1 + µf y = 0;
(23)
In fact, the solution is completely described by the necessary conditions (21)-(24) and the resource constraint (11). It follows directly from (23) thatμ > 0. Moreover, the qualitative properties of the optimal tax system, including its implied behavioral distortions, can be derived from equations (21) (i) The rate of interest is equal to the biological rate of interest; that is,r = f r (k,ỹ) = n.
(ii) There are no distortions in saving behavior; that is,
(iii) The labor supply of individuals of type 2 is not distorted; that is,
(iv) The implicit marginal tax rate (IMTR) on the labor income of individuals of type 1 is positive; specifically,
Parts (i) and (ii) arise because the planner has no reason to distort savings decisions at the margin. Because preferences are separable between consumption and labor supply, low-productivity workers and high-productivity workers considering the possibility of mimicking low-productivity workers are each willing to trade consumption across time at the same implicit prices. Thus, the taxation authority can gain no informational advantage by distorting this margin. Part (iii) is the traditional no distortion result for workers of the higher type. Part (iv) implies that low-skilled individuals face a positive implicit marginal tax rate. Naturally, the specific form of the marginal tax rate is similar to the form found by Weymark (1987) . 8 An immediate consequence of (26) and (27) is that changes in n have no effect on the optimal implicit marginal income tax rates faced by both types of individuals.
The Effects of Aging on the Optimal Tax Schedule
In order to assess the effects of an aging population on the solution to the Steady State Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Problem, it is necessary to describe how its solution varies with the population growth parameter n. The lower the value of n, the larger is the cohort of retirees relative to the cohort of workers. Proposition 2 establishes that it is possible to carry out this comparative static analysis. For all n ∈ R + , the derivative DF of F at n is given by
and where all expressions on the right-hand sides of (29) and (30) are evaluated at the solution to (16) .
Equations (28)-(30) characterize, albeit opaquely, how the optimal allocation changes in response to a change in the rate of population growth. As is shown in the proof of Proposition 2, the structure of the matrix A(n) makes it possible to derive an explicit formula for its inverse. This formula, in turn, can be used to derive expressions for the terms in (28). These expressions are contained in Corollaries 1-4 below.
Corollary 1. There exists numbers ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , ∆ f > 0 and θ < 0 such that
Moreover, if x is (in the neighborhood of the initial optimum) a normal good for each individual and (1 + n) 2k >x then dμ dn > 0.
Corollary 1 shows that the sign of the effect of n on shadow value of the resource constraint is, in general, ambiguous. Normality of x is sufficient to sign the first term in (31). The greater source of ambiguity is the final term, which captures the direct effect of a change in n on the steady state resource constraint. As in all overlapping generations models, an increase in n has both a capital spreading effect, as more workers arrive to work with the existing capital stock, and a reduced dependency effect, as the relative number of retirees falls. While Meijdam and Verbon (1997) are able to sign the relative magnitudes of the capital spreading and dependency effects in their model of public pensions supported by lump-sum taxation, it does not appear possible to do so in the current second-best framework. The condition expressed in the Corollary posits that the capital spreading effect is stronger than the dependency effect. It is, however, possible for the optimal µ to increase with n when the dependency effect dominates capital spreading, provided the dependency effect does not also outweigh the first term in (31). It follows from (3) and (23) thatμ = 1/w. Hence, the shadow value of the resource constraint varies inversely with the aggregate wage rate at the optimum. It seems plausible to expect that an increase in n, which raises the supply of workers, decreases the aggregate wage rate. If this is so, then it is plausible thatμ increases with n.
At the solution to the Steady State Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Problem, the marginal net social value of consumption when young is equal to the marginal social cost of acquiring the resources to finance that consumption,μ. As Corollary 1 shows, an increase in n typical changes the marginal social cost of consumption. For concreteness, suppose thatμ increases. Then, there exists an incentive to economize on the now socially more expensive consumption, and one might expect the optimal consumption when young to fall for all individuals. This intuition must be modified, however, if preferences over consumption are not additive across time periods. The taxation authority can restore the balance between the marginal benefits and marginal costs of consumption by any combination of changes in c and x that produce an appropriate increase in the marginal social value of consumption when young. Corollary 2 provides a formal summary of this discussion.
Corollary 2. For the same ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 > 0 as in Corollary 1,
Moreover, if (in the neighborhood of the initial optimum) v c i x i = 0 then dc i dn has the opposite sign of dμ dn , for i = 1, 2.
An increase in n has two, potentially offsetting, effects on the marginal social cost of consumption in retirement. Because the socially optimal interest rate equals the rate of population growth, an increase in n lowers the opportunity cost of x. In other words, the reduced dependency effect makes the consumption of retirees relatively less expensive. On the other hand, if the social value of resourcesμ increases with n, then all consumption, including consumption in retirement, becomes more socially expensive. The net effect on the opportunity cost of x is ambiguous. 9 Thus, it is impossible to sign the effect of an increase in n on x. Corollary 3 gives an algebraic rendering of the ambiguous effect of n on the optimal consumption in retirement.
Corollary 3. For the same ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 > 0 as in Corollary 1,
It is possible to sign the effect of n on x i when v c i x i is sufficiently small and the dependency effect is sufficiently large (or x sufficiently inferior for the other type of individual) thatμ decreases with n. In this case, the marginal social cost of x i falls and the only effective way to reduce the marginal social benefit commensurately is to increase
It is impossible to sign the effects of an increase in n on the production side of the economy. Corollary 4 displays the potentially offsetting terms.
An increase in the rate of population growth induces an increase in the rate of interest at the optimum. This increase in the rate of interest can be brought about by either a decrease in the capital stock or an increase in aggregate effective labor. 10 Without further restrictions on technology, it is impossible to tell which of these levers the taxation authority would pull. Ambiguity on the production side of the economy disappears when the dependency effect is sufficiently strong (or x sufficiently inferior) so theμ decreases with n. In this event, both capital and aggregate effective labor are optimally reduced in the steady state. Table 1 collects the results of this analysis for the special case of utility that is additive across time. The results are re-phrased in terms of a decrease in n in order that they may cast direct light on the effects of population aging on the solution to the Steady State Optimal Nonlinear Income Tax Problem. The results are most clear-cut when the dependency effect is very strong near the initial optimum. In that case, population aging leads to a decrease in optimal consumption in each period for all individuals, to an increase in the steady state capital stock, and to an increase in aggregate effective labor. Moreover, the steady state aggregate wage falls, so that labor supply must increase for at least one type of individual. Nevertheless, the optimal implicit marginal tax rate remains unchanged. When the dependency effect is more muted, consumption when young increases for workers of both types, as does the aggregate wage, while the optimal implicit marginal tax rate remains unchanged. It is not possible to sign the directions of change in any other variables. 
Concluding Remarks
The rate of population growth affects both the consumption and production sides of the model economy presented in this article. The real price of consumption in retirement is directly affected by the demographic make-up of the population, and the optimal aggregate wage rate is indirectly affected by the relative numbers of workers and retirees.
For some goods and some initial configurations, the price and wage effects reinforce one another; for others, they offset. The results presented in this article identify the competing forces and give them a precise formulation. Moreover, the structure of the matrix A presented in Proposition 2 makes it apparent how to generalize the results to an arbitrary, finite number of skill-types.
It is striking that the implicit marginal income tax rate faced by low-skill workers is invariant to the rate of population growth. However, this result is easily reconciled with the finding by Weymark (1987) and Brett and Weymark (2008a) that for an arbitrary finite number of skill-types, optimal marginal income tax rates depend only on the distribution of skills and the relative welfare weights when preferences are quasi-linear in leisure. Using the same class of preferences, a continuum of skill types and a utilitarian objective, Boadway et al. (2000) find that optimal marginal income tax rates depend only on the distribution of skills. Thus, the invariance result presented here is, in part, an artifact of the form of preferences, but also a consequence of exogenous relative wages.
A natural extension to this work would be an analysis with endogenous relative wages.
The model of Pirttilä and Tuomala (2001) 
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Solving (14) for a 2 v(c 2 , x 2 ) and substituting into (13) yields
Employing the normalization λ 1 + λ 2 = 2 along with (A.1) yields
Solving (14) for a 2 v(c 1 , x 1 ) and substituting into the penultimate term in (A.2) yields, 
Substituting (17) and (18) Proof of Lemma 3. In light of (14), the effective labor supplies can be found by solving the following linear system in the variables y 1 and y 2 .
It is easy to check that (19) and (20) give the solution to the system (A.5).
Proof of Proposition 1. Part (i) follows directly from equations (3) and (24). Part (ii) follows from dividing (21) Recalling the definition of β 1 from (17) and rearranging yields (27).
It is straightforward to check that 12
Incidentally, because H is negative-definite, so is H −1 ; therefore, θ < 0.
Proof of Corollary 1. Using the bottom line of (A.14), (28) and (30) yields Normality of x implies that the terms inside the summation sign on the right-hand side of (31) are negative. Linear homogeneity of f implies that f y is homogeneous of degree zero. Hence, by Euler's Theorem yf yy + kf ky = 0. (A.17) But f yy < 0, so f ky > 0. Hence, the entire expression inside the square bracket is negative when x is normal. Because θ < 0, the first term is positive. Clearly, (1 + n) 2 k > x is sufficient for the final term to be positive as well.
Proof of Corollaries 2-4. It is possible to use equations (A.11)-(A.14) to directly compute the results presented in Corollaries 2-4. However, it is instructive to use a more heuristic solution method. The top six lines of (A.9) can be written The final sentence of Corollary 2 is immediate.
